

DISCUSSION PAPER 1/2018

People, Migration and Security

Africa in a Volatile World

Report on the Tswalu Dialogue, 1–3 December 2017



*Strengthening Africa's
economic performance*



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Background

The Brenthurst Foundation was established by the Oppenheimer Family in October 2004 to examine and promote ways to enhance Africa's economic growth and development. The Foundation's 'Tswalu Dialogue' meeting series brings together the world's leading thinkers and practitioners to consider issues of concern to continental economic development and security.¹ The December 2017 Dialogue examined the security drivers facing Africa, and the challenges in delivering, successfully, external assistance.

Security Drivers

Ten key drivers of African security were identified as a starting point for the Dialogue:

1. **Demographic change:** Sub-Saharan Africa will double its population numbers to over two billion by 2045, and again to over four billion by the turn of the century.
 2. **Urbanisation:** 2035 is estimated to be the first year most Africans will live in cities.
 3. **Economic performance:** The rate of growth has been well below that required to match the demands of the projected rapid population growth. Though this century has seen higher rates of growth, this has largely been driven
- by the price of extractives, and is vulnerable to fluctuations in external demand.
4. **Technology:** While new technologies offer efficiency improvements in the delivery of governance and services, this is tempered by the advent of robotics (and the impact on jobs). The spread of digital communications across the continent has had a dramatic impact on what information people receive and how they network.
 5. **Climate:** The potential for dramatic climate change effects are most notable in the Sahel, potentially affecting up to 350 million people negatively by 2040.
 6. **Democracy:** The spread of democracies in Africa since 1960 has been impressive. But, since the early 2000s this progress has slowed and there have been incidents of regression.
 7. **Nature of international engagement:** This aspect will impact, for good and bad, terms of trade relationships and economic growth, the acceptance or prevention of migrant flows, as well as stability and security.
 8. **Governance:** Improvements in governance in Africa over the last ten years has been slow, at around one per cent improvement over the last decade, despite large volumes of aid and a focus on governance as an area.
 9. **Skills:** While there have been improvements in the delivery of primary education in Africa, completion rates remain problematic,



the region still lags in terms of secondary and tertiary education, and R&D spend.

10. **Pattern of the Political-Economy:** Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the ability of African governments to diversify and provide the jobs desperately required (with nearly 90% of Africans in ‘vulnerable employment’) will hinge on whether these governments (and their elites) are prepared to tackle and change the structure of their colonial economies, which have largely remained intact since independence, characterised by extraction, commodity export and rent-seeking/corruption.

Whether population growth (as the key driver) proves to be a positive force that enables a demographic dividend will depend largely on what African leaders do, and the manner of their engagement with both local and international actors. This raises questions about the reform agenda of African nations, and what international actors with African interests should be doing in support. Without improved growth and better planning, African countries could be a source both of instability with consequent humanitarian issues and *en masse* migrants. How might international actors engage more productively? What role might be

best played by African and external military and security agencies, and where should their focus lie? How might aid agencies better support African and other efforts? How might technology assist? What is the most effective means of delivering training? What is the likely impact of external events – in Europe, the US, Middle East and South and East Asia in particular – on African security and development fortunes? What is the common agenda between African countries and its outside partners, and how might this be most productively pursued?

Matching the above challenges with the shifting concerns of external actors in Africa may prove challenging in some capitals at a moment in history when the points of intersection – migration, radicalisation, state/regional failure, climate change – are threatened to be overshadowed by other concerns, including challenges to the post-1945 world order, the threat of upset to global trade and economic prosperity, cyber-warfare, and the impact of next-generation military technologies.

As a result, some specific tensions arise, especially for the policy maker:

- ▶ Africa does not feature prominently on some international agendas – whatever the rhetoric. What is the likely impact?



- ▶ African countries want higher-tech solutions when the needs are comparatively low-tech. How can this be bridged?
- ▶ The ability to deliver external assistance has been characterised, at times, by short-term impulses and constrained by a lack of resources. How can this be put onto a more strategic footing?

The overall aim of the Dialogue was to establish where and how African and outside actors might best collaborate in meeting these challenges.

Summary of Tswalu Dialogue Sessions

Session One: African Perspectives on Emergent Security Challenges

The first session discussed the threats to African security, both nascent and real, primarily experienced from the perspective of the African policy maker. Major issues were identified as follows:

- ▶ **Demography:** As noted above, projections indicate that Africa will double its population by 2045. Further, 80% of this new population will be living in urban centres.
- ▶ **Technology:** As Africa develops it will adopt technological advances that may aggravate an already surmounting challenge of joblessness, particularly among the youth.
- ▶ **Governance and leadership:** African leaders are challenged to choose visionary and responsible policies that mitigate threats – are African leaders equipped for the task? And yet, in the same vein, it is imperative that Africans ‘are the adjudicators of their own future’; relying exclusively on external actors will not present an enduring solution. Leaders are faced with a trade-off between short-term ‘quick fixes’ with immediate effects (for election purposes) and policies that offer long-term impact. African institutions and the rule of law need to be continuously strengthened to ensure leaders’ accountability.
- ▶ **Identity politics:** African communities that cross-cut international borders potentially provide security challenges, as such situations

strengthen ethnic identities against national identities, and undermine the process of nation-building. This can have a destabilising effect on investment and economic growth.

- ▶ **The triple burden of poverty, inequality and unemployment:** ‘Youth unemployment is a ticking time bomb.’ These threats are amplified by the low economic growth of African economies, driven by their dependence on volatile commodity prices. Effects may include migration, most often intra-African, or mobilisation, through adoption of unifying cause, to commit crimes/acts of terror.

Session Two: External Perspectives

The second session highlighted the tensions experienced by external partners upon providing their assistance to furthering security in Africa. Key tensions were identified:

- ▶ **Strategic vs practical:** The military alone is not a solution to challenges surrounding security, for the underlying causes generally have a political/economic nature. It is best to adopt a 3D approach that balances strategic, long-term measures, and the practical: Diplomacy, Development and Defence. In this way national/regional solutions can be reached with partner nations to meet African ends in a more collaborative way, alongside governments, civil society and citizens.
- ▶ **Building institutions vs tactical support:** Soft aspects of security are crucial, such as: institution-building, investment in youth through education, enhancing civil rights through access to information, and developing responsible future leaders. How do external partners ensure that military assistance has a cross-government and cross-sector effect?
- ▶ **Persistence of external partners vs exit:** It is crucial to understand the drivers of insecurity, how to respond accordingly, and when to adopt a ‘less is more’ approach to military assistance. External actors should be encouraged to apply the guidelines of ‘Priorities, Persistence and Patience’.
- ▶ **Partnership vs self-reliance:** Partnerships need to contain reciprocity. How do external actors develop partnerships with African policy

makers while simultaneously encouraging African self-reliance? A framework must be developed so that partnership and self-reliance can coexist in a positive construct.

- ▶ **Viewing sources of security threats:** External actors view Africa within the context of global security, with an understanding that ‘we ignore Africa at our own peril’. Do Africans and external actors view sources of security threats through the same narrative, or is collaboration a reflection of the niceties?

Session Three: Points of Collaboration

The third session sought to adopt aspects from previous sessions to form points of collaboration between African and external actors on security challenges. Insights provided included:

- ▶ **African solutions to African problems:** Solutions to security challenges need to be driven by Africans. External actors can provide capacity-building assistance and lessons learned, but African policy makers need to accept the responsibility of affecting change from within – moving beyond aid towards achieving national development goals.
- ▶ **The true meaning of partnership:** A candid conversation needs to take place to understand incentive structures of both African and external partners so that partnerships are mutually

beneficial, and able to meet the challenges outlined above. There is an increasing urgency for external partners to ensure return on investment in military assistance.

- ▶ **Software:** Military assistance alone is not a sustainable solution. Collaboration in software areas such as institutional reform, visionary leadership, strengthening democracy and accountability is crucial to address drivers of security challenges, and ensure durable security solutions.
- ▶ **Building ‘quick wins’ into a long-term strategy:** Short-term objectives and *ad hoc* solutions to security dilemmas are necessary in some cases, but should be approached within an existing long-term framework. Constituency and endurance in the long run is what counts to manage security threats in Africa.

Zimbabwe – Thoughts on ZANU-PF’s Regime Change

The 2017 Tswalu Dialogue participants were addressed on the current situation in Zimbabwe by Tendai Biti, former Finance Minister of Zimbabwe’s (2009–2013) Government of National Unity. Mr Biti offered a historical insight into the state of Zimbabwe, which in 1980 emerged from a



war of liberation only to be governed for 37 years by Robert Mugabe, now 93 years old. Mr Biti described the effective ‘military coup’ against Mugabe on 14 November 2017 as multiple crises of the economy, fiscus, politics, society and generation converging to create something fundamentally unique in Zimbabwe’s history. ‘We didn’t think this would happen in our lifetime,’ he said, as many Zimbabweans like him supported Mugabe’s efforts in the liberation struggle, and also during his early days as President. At the sight of crowds marching alongside army tanks, Mr Biti expressed his optimism for Zimbabwe’s future on 18 November, later also with the resignation of Mugabe and the swearing-in of the new President, Mr Emmerson Mnangagwa. Yet, the new interim cabinet named on 30 November, which Mr Biti views as having ‘no legitimacy, no moral or legal authority to exercise executive power’, does not reveal a break from the past. The optimism that was so keenly felt during the march quickly dwindled.

Mr Biti’s hope for Zimbabwe is an inclusive transitional process that ensures four key steps leading up to the next election: 1) retaining peace and security for Zimbabweans; 2) institutional reform to ensure a strong judiciary and the rule of law; 3) economic reforms that undo the harmful economic policies of the previous government; and 4) international relations reform to reintegrate Zimbabwe into the international community. Mr Biti called for Zimbabweans, and Southern Africans in general, to step away from placing their trust in individuals, and to instead trust strong institutions. Mugabe, as the national liberator, betrayed the country’s trust, and as a result Zimbabweans are urged to enter this new era, ‘on a cornerstone of total mistrust’, he argued. Zimbabwe is at a crossroads between the tanks, seen that day of the march, and its people. How does Zimbabwe ensure that foundations are laid for a new, sustainable era of freedom, justice and inclusivity? Mr Biti argued that assistance from external partners from Africa and abroad is key to shaping a new paradigm.

Conclusion: Some Policy Guidelines on Military Assistance to Africa

What insights and policy guidelines were gleaned from the dialogue at Tswalu?²

‘A lot of people,’ says General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the British Army, ‘look at Africa through their own eyes. But to be effective, they need to give Africa what it requires.’

The problem with foreign military assistance to Africa is not principally in the volume, or even the enthusiasm of the donors to provide more; it’s to do with managing a series of tensions inherent in the relationship between provider and recipient. While partnership is a common theme in every discussion about foreign assistance, the reality is that its effectiveness often trips up over a difference between the short-term interests of the provider and the longer-term developmental needs of the recipient. In addition, military assistance does not always meet the local internal security needs around policing, nor does it routinely provide the type of strategic support required to building institutions and human capacity.

There is, however, plenty of current activity across the continent.

Currently Britain has military training and assistance teams permanently located in Nigeria and Kenya. Its South African-based team closes this week. This year marks the tenth anniversary of US African Command. AFRICOM’s continental focus is on Somalia and the African Union’s AMISOM mission in the East, counter-terrorism in Libya in the North, and in supporting stabilisation efforts in the Lake Chad basin in the West. These areas of focus are complemented by its base in Djibouti and regular exercises across the continent. France currently deploys 4 500 troops in the northern Sahel on *Operation Barkhane* and another 3 000 in its ‘reservoir’ of bases in Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Senegal, plus another 1 600 in Réunion. France also trains not fewer than 25 000 African troops every year. France’s commitment to Africa is considerable, perhaps to be expected of a country where 15% of its population is of African descent.


Of course these are not the only foreign troops on African soil. There are currently seven United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, the largest being in South Sudan (UNMISS) with 12 500 troops, the 4 400 troops in the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNIFSA), the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) with 15 500 troops, and 11 230 in the UN Multi-Dimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The European Union, too, has deployed eight civilian and military missions across Africa (EUCAP Sahel; EUCAP Niger; EUCAP Somalia; EUTM Somalia; EUNAVFOR Atalanta; EUBAM Libya; EUTM Mali; EUTM RCA), in addition to its significant financial contribution to the African Union’s peace and security architecture.

The two largest African operations currently are AMISOM with 22 126 personnel, mainly from Uganda (6 223), Ethiopia (4 395), Kenya (3 664) and Burundi (5 432), and the 5 000-strong G5 mission in the Sahel, made up of troops from Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad, fighting alongside the French and MINUSMA contingent.

Despite considerable military and other assistance, Mali, now at the epicentre of the G5’s efforts, failed to ensure its security. A poster-child of democratic reform after its 1991 revolution, it received not less than \$17 billion in donor assistance over the next 20 years, peaking at an amount that equated to \$81 per capita in 2011. However, its military not only proved unable to deal with a combination of Touareg separatists, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and roving criminal bands, but seized power in a *coup d’état* in March 2012.

The need to spend aid better is brought into even sharper relief by the regular flow of African migrants across the Mediterranean, which increased from 154 000 in 2015 to 180 000 in 2016 mainly through Libya, 90% of who have no prospect of asylum in the EU. The UN projects that African migrants in richer OECD countries will increase from six million in 2013 to 34 million in 2050. This will likely be dwarfed by internal migration. Today two-thirds of Africa’s dislocated population is internally displaced, totalling 13 million people, a 65% increase on 2013.

Aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa since 1990³



Despite the considerable support provided, Mali’s military failed in 2011 for a number of reasons. For one, the Malians selected people for training based on patronage and personal connections rather than their suitability. Furthermore, the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 transformed Libya from an exporter of largesse to one of instability.

As the African countries and their allies face up to the considerable security challenges that remain on the continent and the likely compounding effects of rapid population growth twinned with low economic growth, now is a good time to take stock. A number of clear rules stand out for Western taxpayers and African recipients alike to get more bang for their buck.

At the outset the relationship has to be conceived as a partnership rather than one of dependency. To do so, there has to be a common narrative, a shared and coherent understanding of the overall purpose of the assistance offered. This often comes about through personal contact, but always requires in-depth, detailed understanding of local circumstances.

There thus needs to be an honest conversation between partners as to what problem they are trying to solve together. Simply attempting partnerships without taking time to develop a common approach and objectives is fruitless.

As the joint planning starts, narrowly focused tactical actions should be aligned to longer-term goals. In meeting these, however, as General Carter has argued, the general guidelines of Priorities, Persistence and Patience should be followed.




Addressing the migrant crisis, for example, requires changing the supply side conditions – why African migrants choose to move to Europe or, for that matter, other African countries. This needs to be thought of as a cycle: political stability begets inclusive functioning economies which, in turn, helps create safe and cohesive societies encouraging capital investment, generating opportunities for advancement including education and employment.

Africa receives over \$40 billion in official development assistance, and perhaps the same amount again in other flows, including various forms of Chinese assistance. Aid can be useful, especially if it is targeted in areas that local government or private investors are loath to or cannot go – for example, in providing resources to develop leadership.

More could be done in this regard. For example, the United Kingdom’s offer of Chevening scholarships (approximately 1 620 in 2017/2018), and DFID-funded Commonwealth scholarships (approximately 800), these are dwarfed by what China and India have offered. China has pledged

to train 30 000 African government officials and 2 000 students a year. As of 2017, according to the Chinese Ministry of Education, more Anglophone African students study in China than the US or the UK.⁴ India has promised to provide 50 000 scholarships too over the next five years. Morocco has also offered 10 000 places annually.

China’s international student numbers



Donors can also prime the development pump through reducing the risk premium for investors, especially in fixed infrastructure.

Support for democracy is similarly key to improving governance and creating conditions of political stability. It is no coincidence that eight of the top-ten countries of origin of Africa's 18.5 million displaced people live under autocratic government. No area of targeted financial or other means of support can thus be separated out from the overall developmental context in which African countries find themselves.

Institutions matter in setting this context. But these institutions will not survive if they come about through external training, equipping, technical assistance or aid. Partners can share lessons

and insights, but ultimately institutions can only arise from internal struggles and debate, which produce a social contract. This explains why democracy, legitimacy, accountability and development performance go hand in hand.

And this illustrates the centrality of good leadership, capable of setting a vision and acting against it, finding the means to create better policy, and improve governance. Insecurity in Africa is an effect of exclusion – globally, from growth opportunities; domestically, from education, employment and other prospects.

The purpose of foreign assistance, should address these sources of fundamental friction if the continent is to finally get beyond aid.

Participant List

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Endnotes

- 1 See <http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/tswalu-dialogue.htm>
- 2 See <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-05-op-ed-getting-beyond-aid-in-africa/#.WigEu0qWaM9>
- 3 See <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>
- 4 See <https://qz.com/1119447/china-is-training-africas-next-generation-of-leaders/>.